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Abstract The genomics “revolution” is spreading. 
Originating in the molecular life sciences, it initially 
affected a number of biomedical research fields such as 
cancer genomics and clinical genetics. Now, however, a 
new ‘‘wave’’ of genomic bioinformation is transforming a 
widening array of disciplines, including those that address 
the social, historical and cultural dimensions of human life. 
Increasingly, bioinformation is affecting ‘‘human sciences’’ 
such as psychiatry, psychology, brain research, behavioural 
research (“behavioural genomics’’), but also anthropology 
and archaeology (“bioarchaeology”). Thus, bioinformatics 
is having an impact on how we define and understand 
ourselves, how identities are formed and constituted, and, 
finally, on how we (on the basis of these redefined identi­
ties) assess and address some of the more concrete societal 
issues involved in genomics governance in various settings. 
This article explores how genomics and bioinformation, by 
influencing research agendas in the human sciences and the 
humanities, are affecting our self-image, our identity, the 
way we see ourselves. The impact of bioinformation on 
self-understanding will be assessed on three levels: (1) the 
collective level (the impact of comparative genomics on 
our understanding of human beings as a species), (2) the 
individual level (the impact of behavioural genomics on 
our understanding of ourselves as individuals), and (3) the 
genealogical level (the impact of population genomics on 
our understanding of human history, notably early human
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history). This threefold impact will be assessed from two 
seemingly incompatible philosophical perspectives, 
namely a ‘‘humanistic’’ perspective (represented in this 
article by Francis Fukuyama) and a ‘‘post-humanistic’’ one 
(represented by Peter Sloterdijk). On the basis of this 
analysis it will be concluded that, rather than focussing on 
human “enhancement” by adding or deleting genes, gen­
ome-oriented practices of the Self will focus on using 
genomics information in the context of identity-formation. 
Genomic bioinformation will increasingly be built into our 
self-images and used in order to tailor and adapt our 
practices of Self to our “personalised” genome. We will 
keep working on ourselves, no doubt, not by modifying our 
genomes, but rather by fine-tuning our behaviour. What we 
are experiencing is a bioinformatisation of the life-world. 
Genomics-based technologies will increasingly pervade 
our daily lives, our autobiographies and narratives, as well 
as our anthropologies, rather than our genomes as such.
Keywords Genomics • Identity • Bioinformation • 
Anthropotechnologies • Post-humanism •
Francis Fukuyama • Peter Sloterdijk
Introduction: genomics and bioinformatics as emerging 
fields
The Human Genome Project (1990-2004) symbolises the 
emergence of genomics as a new techno-scientific field 
(IHGSC 2001, 2004), building on technologies for high 
throughput bioinformatics and opting for a whole genome- 
oriented, rather than for a single gene-oriented approach. It 
has resulted in a steady stream of ever-larger and more 
complex genomic data sets, thus transforming the study of 
virtually all forms of life. Genomics is not a particular
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branch of biology, but rather a transformation of the ways 
in which research in the life sciences is done (Collins et al. 
2003). In various research fields, it has provided 
researchers with new research strategies that allow or 
challenge them to reframe and redefine their basic issues.
Bioinformatics can be regarded as the ‘‘core’’ discipline 
of genomics. It develops statistical and computational 
techniques to analyse large amounts of biological infor­
mation in a data-driven—rather than hypothesis-driven— 
fashion. According to the NIH working definition,1 bioin­
formatics can be defined as research, development and 
application of computational tools for the use of biological, 
medical, behavioural or health data (the acquisition, stor­
age and visualisation of such data). The emergence of 
bioinformatics is not a purely academic affair. On the 
contrary, it is part of the social reality of today. The bio­
informatisation of science reflects and supports the 
‘‘bioinformatisation’’ of life and of society at large. New 
forms of bioinformation allow new identities, new cate­
gorisations and new forms of social organisation to emerge. 
Large-scale population databases open up new forms of 
societal monitoring and surveillance, while individuals and 
consumers are invited to use personalised bioinformation 
in order to tailor their life style and diets to their genomes.
Bioinformatics analyses ‘‘in silico DNA’’, thereby 
facilitating the “informatisation” of life. Large amounts of 
bioinformation are becoming available in electronic for­
mats for research communities worldwide. Because 
bioinformation is immaterial, it can be more easily man­
aged, analysed and manipulated than the material realities 
it represents (Gaskell and Bauer 2006, p. 10). An exem­
plification of the key role of bioinformatics in genomics is 
GenBank, the NIH genetic sequence database, an annotated 
collection of all publicly available DNA sequences. The 
emergence of bioinformatics has not only affected the ways 
in which knowledge is produced and disseminated, but also 
resulted in an increase of the scale and pace of life science 
research, as large consortia are sequencing and analysing 
the genomes of a steadily growing number of species.
As Thacker (2005) and others have argued, genomics 
has resulted in DNA now being available in more than one 
format: besides ‘‘wet’’ or living DNA (DNA in organisms, 
cells or test tubes) we have access to ‘‘dry’’ DNA, stored in 
computer databases, lap tops or on CS-ROMs, to be 
downloaded and disseminated electronically through por­
tals and electronic networks. This mobility of biological 
information across media (living bodies, laboratories, 
Internet sites, databases, patent offices), its availability 
in vivo, in vitro as well as in silico, enhances its usability. 
Thus, bioinformatics is more than a mere ‘‘tool’’. It is
1 http://www.bisti.nih.gov/CompuBioDef.pdf.
transforming agendas for research and reshaping agendas 
for societal debate.
The genomics ‘‘epidemic’’ is spreading. Originating in 
the molecular life sciences, it initially affected a number of 
biomedical research fields, such as cancer genomics and 
clinical genetics. Now, however, a new ‘‘wave’’ of bioin­
formation is transforming a widening array of disciplines, 
including those that address the social, historical and cul­
tural dimensions of human life. Increasingly, 
bioinformation is affecting ‘‘human sciences’’ such as 
psychiatry, psychology, brain research, behavioural 
research (‘‘behavioural genomics’’), but also anthropology 
and archaeology (‘‘bioarchaeology’’). Thus, bioinformatics 
is having an impact on how we define and understand 
ourselves, how identities are formed and constituted, and, 
finally, on how we (on the basis of these emerging iden­
tities) assess and address some of the more concrete 
societal issues involved in genomics governance in various 
settings.
This article explores how genomics and bioinformation, 
by influencing research agendas in the human sciences and 
the humanities, are affecting our self-image, our identity, 
the way we see ourselves. The impact of bioinformation on 
self-understanding will be assessed on three levels:
(1) the collective level: the impact of comparative 
genomics on our understanding of human beings as 
a species (species identity);
(2) the individual level: the impact of behavioural 
genomics on our understanding of ourselves as 
individuals (personal identity), and
(3) the genealogical level: the impact of population 
genomics on our understanding of human history 
(historical identity).
On all three levels, the traditional ‘‘humanistic’’ view 
concerning the humanness of human beings is under 
pressure. Indeed, the genomics revolution has fuelled a 
debate between a humanistic and a post-humanistic 
understanding of what it means to be human. In this article, 
Francis Fukuyama and Peter Sloterdijk will be regarded as 
‘‘spokespersons’’, as it were, of a humanistic and post­
humanistic understanding respectively. Building on their 
writings, the question will be addressed how the bioinfor­
mation of our self-understanding revivifies some of the 
basic questions of philosophical anthropology. And this is 
more than merely an ‘‘academic’’ exercise, as our basic 
view of ourselves, our philosophical anthropology, will 
affect the way we assess the uses of genomics-based 
applications now and in the future. This notably applies to 
genomics-based technologies that, at some point in the 
future, may assist us in enhancing and developing our­
selves, either individually or collectively.
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The impact of bioinformation on our collective identity: 
who are we?
‘‘God bless me, the man seems hardly human! Something 
troglodytic, shall we say’’ (Robert Louis Stevenson, 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde)2
In a famous essay Freud (1917/1947) has argued that 
major scientific discoveries entail narcissistic ‘‘offences’’. 
Whereas we tend to see ourselves as central and unique, 
scientific research time and again exposes us to the fact that 
we are not, at least not in the way we initially imagined. 
Copernican heliocentrism for example demonstrated that 
we, rather than occupying a stable and central position in 
the universe, are aimlessly floating through the cold, dark, 
silent and infinite immensities of space. Subsequently, 
Darwin’s theory of evolution indicated that we do not 
fundamentally differ from other species. We are not a 
special kind of entity, but merely one species among oth­
ers, the outcome of a process of evolution that will 
continue to shape and change us. As a third major offence, 
Freud listed—somewhat narcissistically perhaps—psycho- 
analysis: the message that we are not master in our own 
house, but rather driven by unconscious impulse.
The Human Genome Project (HGP) can be regarded as 
the most recent in a whole series of narcissistic offences 
(Zwart 2007a), first of all because of the surprisingly small 
number of genes on the human genome (in comparison to 
other, apparently less complex ‘‘model’’ species such as 
worms, flies and plants), but also because of the surpris­
ingly small differences between the human genome and the 
genomes of other mammals such as the chimpanzee or the 
laboratory mouse. Whereas initial estimates concerning the 
number of protein-coding genes on the human genome 
ranged from *  100,000 up to *200,000, it was eventually 
concluded that the human genome contains something like 
*22,500 genes, which was something of a surprise.3 
Moreover, comparative genomics has shown that seem­
ingly very different organisms are—genomically speaking 
at least— ‘‘amazingly like humans’’ (Nature 437, 7055, p. 
47) and that notably the differences between the common 
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) and Homo sapiens appear to 
be very minute indeed.
On September 1, 2005 The Chimpanzee Sequencing and 
Analysis Consortium published the draft genome sequence 
of the common chimpanzee in Nature. It was presented as a 
final confirmation of the Darwinian claim that humans and 
primates share recent common ancestors (they separated
2 Stevenson (1886/1981, p. 18).
3 Notably when compared to the number of genes on other model
genomes such as those of Drosophila melanogaster ( *  14.000 genes), 
Caenorhabditis elegans (*19.000 genes) and Arabidopsis thaliana 
(*25.000 genes).
about 5 million years ago). The work of Wolfgang Kohler 
(describing how chimpanzees solve problems), Jane Goo- 
dall (describing how chimpanzees use tools) and Frans de 
Waal (describing how chimpanzees engage in group poli­
tics) already revealed a number of ‘‘startling behavioural 
similarities’’ (p. 69), but now genomics research indicates, 
according to the authors, that chimpanzees ‘‘are especially 
suited to teach us about ourselves’’ (p. 69), both in terms of 
their similarities and in terms of their differences with 
humans. Indeed, the availability of ‘‘a second hominid 
genome’’ (p. 83) revivifies the question: ‘‘what makes us 
human?’’ (p. 83).4
It may seem somewhat premature to so eagerly include the 
HGP in this impressive series of major scientific break­
throughs or Copernican revolutions. Perhaps we should 
rather be more reluctant when it comes to determining 
whether the impact of the HGP will really equal the grand 
expectations of those immediately involved. On the other 
hand, none of these listings is beyond contestation. Coper­
nicus’ publication on the ‘‘revolutions’’ of the heavenly 
bodies more or less went unnoticed in 1543 and in many 
respects Copernicus still adhered to traditional ideas, such as 
the one articulated in the very first sentence of Book I, 
namely that the universe must be spherical as ‘‘the sphere is 
the most perfect of all forms’’ (1978/1992, p. 8). Moreover, 
although psychoanalysis must have seemed a major revo­
lution in the eyes of Freud and his followers, the question 
whether Freud’s impact really equalled that of, say, Darwin 
is a difficult one to answer. Nonetheless, I belief that the halo 
of significance associated with the HGP reflects more than 
mere science rhetoric. Comparative genomics inevitably 
challenges us to redefine ourselves. For centuries ‘‘we’’— 
and this notably refers to ‘‘philosophers’’—have been 
framing the relationship between humans and other animals, 
including primates, in terms of discontinuity. We experi­
enced ourselves as fundamentally different, as an ‘‘animal 
rationale’’, a species or entity that ‘‘had’’ something which 
other species lacked (be it a ‘‘soul’’ or the capacity to ‘‘rea­
son’’ and ‘‘reflect’’). Other species were defined in terms of a 
basic ontological deficiency. Indeed, we tended to regard 
ourselves, not as a species, but as a distinct ontological cat­
egory, and for good reasons, so it seemed, as the 
discontinuity between us and other animals (including pri­
mates) seems undeniable. We live in a highly advanced 
techno-cultural environment of our own making. Although 
(other) primates may communicate with one another, their 
communication techniques do not equal the symbolic
4 ‘‘We still do not have in our hands the answer to the most 
fundamental question: what makes us human? But this genomic 
comparison dramatically narrows the search for the key biological 
differences between the two species’’. Robert Waterston, cited in 
‘‘BBC News, ‘Life code’ of chimps laid bare’’. http://newsvote.bbc. 
co.uk, Monday 5 April 2004.
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complexities of human language use. And although (other) 
primates may engage in forms of group dynamics that to a 
certain extent can be described as ‘‘politics’’, these behav­
ioural patterns can never equal the complex symbolical order 
of representative democracies, or the intricate governmental 
systems devoted to managing the peaceful coexistence 
and collaboration of large numbers of people through long­
distance governance and advanced techniques of adminis­
tration. Still, these apparently undeniable differences are not 
immediately visible if we merely look at our genomes. From 
the point of view of comparative genomics, the humanity of 
human beings seems to evaporate.
Whereas the HGP focussed on the genome of mankind 
as such, the next step will be to take up sequencing the 
genomes of individuals. This process has already started. 
The individual genome sequences of genomics pioneers 
such as Craig Venter and James Watson are electronically 
available and the number of individuals who actually have 
access to their personal genomic sequence is rapidly (if not 
exponentially) increasing. What does this mean for how we 
see ourselves? How is genomics affecting our self-under­
standing on the individual level?
The impact of bioinformation on our personal 
identity: the personalised genome
It is generally expected that, within 10 years or so, the 
famous $1,000 (or € 1,000) personal genome sequence will 
be affordable and available for citizens. In his recent auto­
biography A life decoded, Venter (2007) not only relates, 
from an insider’s perspective, how bioinformation changed 
the biomedical research landscape, but he also demonstrates 
what the impact of personalised genomics might be in the 
near future. Venter was one of the first individuals who had 
the privilege of seeing and studying his own personal gen­
ome sequence. Thus, his autobiography not only tells us the 
story of his life (parents, youth in California, traumatic 
experiences in Vietnam, fierce opposition from envious 
competitive colleagues, etc.), as autobiographies by scien­
tists usually do. In at least one respect, his autobiography is 
unprecedented and unique. Repeatedly, the narrative is 
interrupted by text-boxes informing us about a particular 
gene Venter encountered on his personal genome. Notably, 
he focuses on genes that are associated with behavioural 
characteristics, such as ADHD, risk-seeking behaviour and 
stress tolerance. In retrospect he explicitly makes a series of 
connections between the vicissitudes of his life and the 
genes on his genome. In doing so, he may well be setting a 
standard for how in the near future personalized genomics 
information may be applied in the context of self-under­
standing and self-assessment. Venter’s autobiography may 
constitute a paradigm for future practices of the Self. In the
future, individuals may redirect their ambitions and training 
trajectories, for instance, on the basis of their genome. It is 
certainly no coincidence that Venter’s autobiography coin­
cides in time with the emergence of behavioural genomics.
Venter’s autobiography also coincides in time with 
Michael Crichton’s most recent novel Next (2006), another 
example of a document that explores the impact of per­
sonalised bioinformation on individual self-understanding. 
The book can be read as a literary scenario study devoted to 
outlining the meaning of genomics for identity-formation. 
It introduces a number of individuals who are actively 
engaged in redefining themselves in terms of their genetic 
profile. The various story lines develop around a number of 
‘‘genes for’’—genes that supposedly co-determine behav­
ioural characteristics, such as the maturity gene, the 
novelty— (or thrill-seeking) gene, the sociability gene and 
the infidelity gene. The maturity gene, for instance, puts 
deviant forms of behaviour, such as drug addiction, in a 
new, genome-based perspective, one that has far-reaching 
implications for how individuals see their responsibility in 
shaping their own lives as well as for how they relate to 
parents, brothers, sisters and spouses. Genomics technolo­
gies are used for a broad variety of ‘‘practices of the Self’’, 
to use a Foucauldian term, and Crichton outlines their 
possible impact on identity-development, ranging from 
paternity testing and partner selection to the ways in which 
individuals present themselves in court. For instance, while 
some lawyers recommend screening for the novelty-seek­
ing gene as a possible mitigating circumstance on behalf of 
clients who happen to engage in risky lifestyles, others 
suggest to subject former partners to genetic screening in 
the context of custody cases. Like Venter’s autobiography, 
Crichton’s book reflects, albeit in a somewhat exaggerated 
and soap-like fashion, the societal implications of current 
developments in behavioural genomics. And although 
some of the events described seem to take the logic of 
behavioural genomics to the point of absurdity, in most 
cases there are traceable connections with ongoing research 
programs (Zwart 2007b).
As Asherson (2005) and other behavioural genomics 
experts have argued, the sequencing of the human genome 
has opened up ways for investigators in behavioural studies 
to identify genes that may influence human behaviour. It is 
clear, of course, that this will be a complex task since 
human behaviour as a rule does not result from simple one- 
to-one relationships with causal genes. Rather, what will be 
discovered are complex networks of co-acting, correlated 
and interactional factors. Yet, despite the inherent com­
plexity that is to be expected, ‘‘combining quantitative and 
molecular genetic strategies with social, developmental, 
environmental, neurobiological and psychological methods 
holds the promise of elucidating major components of 
‘aetiological networks’’’ involved in behavioural traits such
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as Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder or susceptibil­
ity to drug abuse (p. 1). In the near future, genomic 
bioinformation may gradually replace, or at least comple­
ment, information from other sources such as psychological 
tests, psychotherapy and family history—or even astrology.
Thus, personalised genomics may well generate a whole 
range of issues and questions that have to do with how 
identities are defined and how new categories in terms of 
personality traits, psychic typologies, accountability etc. 
are bound to emerge. W ill this development ‘‘empower’’ 
citizens to ‘‘manage’’ their own lives, to shape their own 
biographies and futures; will they be enabled to ‘‘relate’’ 
critically and creatively to their genomic ‘‘profiles’’, as 
authors of their own life stories? Or will it rather lead to 
practices of exclusion and surveillance, that is: will indi­
viduals rather be defined by new genomics-based practices 
of categorisation? Those are the type of normative ques­
tions that are likely to result from these developments. 
Instead of presenting ourselves as ‘‘choleric’’ or ‘‘melan­
cholic’’, or as ‘‘introvert’’ rather than ‘‘extravert’’, we may 
in the future develop new typologies that will increasingly 
rely on the idioms of genomics.
Besides the collective genome of mankind and the 
genomes of individuals, the unravelling of human 
genomics unfolds in yet another direction, namely along 
the lines of history. When it comes to understanding our­
selves, history is important. Human beings tend to see 
themselves as the outcome of a dramatic historical narra­
tive, characterized by a number of decisive turning points. 
Also in this dimension, genomics is redefining the field.
The impact of bioinformation on our genealogical 
identity: the domesticated genome
Genomics and bioinformatics are not only affecting bio­
medical or behavioural sciences such as psychiatry and 
psychology, but also research fields that are usually regarded 
as belonging to the humanities side of the spectrum, such as 
archaeology. Luca Cavalli-Sforza and Allan Wilson’s 
Human Genome Diversity Project (also known as the 
‘‘second’’ Human Genome Project) as well as the HapMap 
project and the Genographic Project5 of National Geo­
graphic and IBM are shedding new light on (early) human 
history and have re-opened a number of debates in archae­
ology, palaeontology, language studies and cultural 
anthropology that are of key importance for our under­
standing of the origins of human society and culture 
(Cavalli-Sforza and Cavalli-Sforza 1995; Stone andLurquin 
2005). By affecting our views on our own pre-historical 
origins, these research programmes may well influence the
5 https://www3.nationalgeographic.com/genographic/.
ways in which we see our place in the contemporary world. 
The impact of genomics on human sciences and humanities 
has a clear ‘‘societal relevance’’, as our views of ourselves as 
social and cultural beings, as well as our understanding of 
our origin and past, will profoundly affect the ways in which 
we define and position ourselves in current debates on the 
use of various genomics applications, now and in the future. 
The projects mentioned are part of an emerging landscape in 
which identities are made and unmade (M’charec 2005; 
Nash 2005). It affects views on identity and history both in 
the academic as in the public realm.
In the academic realm, genomics is having a tremendous 
impact on research agendas. Its impact on archaeology is 
exemplified by a recent science autobiography, written by 
the prominent archaeologist Jones (2001). His book is 
actually an analysis in retrospect of the bioinformatisation 
of his field. Jones describes how bioinformation has 
transformed archaeology in a very profound way—has 
transformed it into bioarchaeology. The focus of attention 
has shifted from analysing artefacts such as pottery or 
ornaments or tools, to analysing DNA fragments in organic 
remains (seeds, animal bones, human bones, etc.) as 
sources of information concerning the health and nutrition 
of ancient rural communities. The focus of interest of bi­
oarchaeology is on the plants these rural communities 
cultivated, on the animals they domesticated, on the 
‘‘biotechnologies’’ they used (notably micro-organisms 
such as yeast for purposes of fermentation) as well as on 
the man-made ecosystems they created. Due to this shift, 
archaeologists became ‘‘molecule hunters’’. Contemporary 
archaeologists are overwhelmed by huge amounts of bio­
information. Their research practice reflects what Thacker 
(2005) has termed the ‘‘excess’’ of bioinformation. And 
Jones also emphasises what was already argued above, 
namely that our (changing) view on early human history 
has a ‘‘relevance’’ for society today: it affects the way we 
see ourselves and our place in nature (p. 40).
Of special importance in this respect is the so-called 
Neolithic revolution: the emergence of agriculture
*  10,000 years ago in the Near East, China, India and 
Mexico. In the context of this historical marker of pivotal 
importance, mankind began to create artificial environ­
ments: controlled, domesticated landscapes. Instead of 
consuming food products that were provided by natural 
habitats, human beings began to produce their own food. 
This dramatically changed the human way of life. Mankind 
began to settle down. A human life-world emerged. We 
domesticated plants, animals and environments—but we 
primarily domesticated ourselves. This process is docu­
mented in human DNA, either ‘‘old’’ DNA (encountered in 
bones and other remains) or ‘‘modern’’ DNA (the DNA of 
living individuals as a kind of archive containing informa­
tion on, for instance, early human migration routes). But
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bioarchaeology is also interested in the genomes of other 
species, especially plants species such as cereals and rice, 
but also animal species such as dogs, horses, camels, cows 
and pigs, organisms that became part of the new agricul­
tural, anthropogenic ecosystems, of the Neolithic Arks that 
provided shelter, a protective shell or sphere that safe­
guarded not only ourselves but our domesticated partner 
species as well from direct exposure to natural environ­
ments. Thus, genomics may allow us to reconstruct, more 
accurately than ever before, the history and genesis of what 
in phenomenology is termed the human life-world. In recent 
years, not only the human genome has been sequenced, but 
the genomes of a number of other ‘‘domesticated’’ species 
as well, plants and animals whose destinies became inti­
mately connected with ours. One of the consequences is 
that our view of early human history is shifting from an 
anthropocentric view towards a much more ecocentric 
perspective: the early development of rural communities as 
multi-species networks. In ancient rural environments, 
humans, cultivated plants and domesticated animals 
became involved in complex processes of co-evolution, 
mutually beneficial to the various species involved.
This already started long ago, even before the onset of 
the Neolithic revolution, as ancient hunters and gatherers 
managed to survive, not only because of their unique 
cognitive qualities as human beings, but also because of the 
complementary skills and talents of their dogs. As sledge 
dogs or pack animals, these domesticated animals signifi­
cantly increased human mobility, and as hunters they 
proved outstanding team players. Dogs and humans have to 
some extent domesticated each other, ‘‘forging a hunting 
partnership that was advantageous to both’’ (p. 111).
Subsequently, in the context of the Neolithic revolution, 
animals became involved in the process of domestication, 
an important turning point in human history. While the 
ancestors of domesticated cows, horses and camels became 
extinct, domestication provided a ‘‘life line’’ for these 
species. At the same time, they contributed to human sur­
vival under difficult or even adverse conditions. The history 
of these inter-species communities and their interconti­
nental journeys can now be reconstructed in more reliable 
ways, either by means of ‘‘old’’ DNA (analysis of remains 
of humans as well as of cultivated plants and domesticated 
species) or by means of ‘‘modern’’ DNA (in vivo genomes, 
used as archives containing markers and footprints reflect­
ing past events such as migratory journeys).
This academic rewriting of collective genealogical tra­
jectories coincides with a growing impact of genomics-
6 Examples of genomics ‘‘milestones’’ in this respect are research 
concerning the genomic evolution of species such as rice (Normile 
and Pennisi 2002), pig (Larson et al. 2007) and cow: http://www. 
hgsc.bcm.tmc.edu/projects/bovine/, http://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2006/08/060819112235.htm.
based tools on genealogical practices of the Self in the 
public realm, as new possibilities for genealogical research 
are becoming available for individuals. These new tools 
will allow them to reconstruct personal genealogies and 
identities in various manners and may complement or even 
eclipse the more traditional sources of identify-formation 
such as genealogical archives for pedigree or ancestor 
research. Increasingly, moreover, novel tools will be made 
available by commercial companies, triggering the curi­
osities or uncertainties of individuals concerning their 
ethnic origins and identities by providing sources of bio­
information pertinent to genealogical identity. The 
question than is, to what extent such emerging practices 
should be regarded as instances of empowerment and 
agency or rather as symptomatic evidence of new practices 
of segregation and classification? Are the individuals 
involved the subjects of new practices of Self-formation, or 
rather the objects of marketing strategies, that is: mere 
consumers of novel genomics products? W ill these prod­
ucts incite experiences of belonging, or rather practices of 
exclusion? Last but not least, are current bioethical reper­
toires able to address such issues? In other words, although 
collectively, individually as well as historically new forms 
of bioinformation are affecting our views about ourselves, 
it is far from clear how these newly emerging options and 
perspectives are to be assessed.
A bioethical assessment must build, however, on an 
anthropological one. Anthropological issues must be 
addressed first in order to prepare the terrain, as it were, for 
bioethical inquiries. What exactly is the impact of these 
novel possibilities for identity formation on our self­
image? How, for instance, is genomics-based bioinforma­
tion affecting our views on the relationship between human 
beings and other species? Questions of this type must be 
clarified before we can take the ethical approach. And they 
traditionally belong to the special sub-discipline within 
philosophy called ‘‘philosophical anthropology’’, a 
research field that became specialised in assessing and 
‘‘absorbing’’ the insights and findings of natural and human 
sciences. Implicitly or explicitly, our philosophical 
anthropology will affect the ways in which bioethical 
issues (notably issues concerning the application of 
genomics-based biotechnologies to human beings) will be 
articulated and addressed. Therefore, it can be regarded as 
the missing link, the intermediary zone between the phi­
losophy of biology (which tends to study human beings 
from a biological or species perspective) and bioethics 
(which tends to see human beings as autonomous and 
responsible subjects, different from animals).
Traditionally, philosophical anthropology was domi­
nated by an anthropocentric and humanistic conception of 
what it means to be human. In the face of novel forms of 
bioinformation as described above, this humanistic vision
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of ourselves is under siege. In response to the emergence of 
genomics and bioinformation, a debate is developing 
between a ‘‘humanistic’’ and a ‘‘post-humanistic’’ per­
spective on the past, present and future of mankind. The 
way we position ourselves in this debate will profoundly 
affect how we will assess a number of recent biomedical 
developments (such as cloning, genetic modification, or 
tissue engineering). In other words, our basic self-image, 
our ‘‘philosophical anthropology’’ will determine to a sig­
nificant extent our involvement in bioethical deliberations. 
Implicitly or explicitly, a philosophical anthropology is 
always informing our bioethical views. New forms of 
bioinformation challenge us to take position and to opt, 
either for a humanistic or for a post-humanistic view. In 
the following sections, both positions will be represented 
by recent publications of prominent spokespersons, one for 
each view, namely Francis Fukuyama (representing 
‘‘humanism’’) and Peter Sloterdijk (representing ‘‘post­
humanism’’). In this respect, this paper constitutes a 
counterpart or complement to a similar debate staged by 
Andrew Edgar in his contribution to this thematic issue 
between Habermas (representing humanism) and his tran­
shumanist antagonists (Edgar 2009).
The humanistic response: Francis Fukuyama 
on human dignity
In his book Our posthuman future Francis Fukuyama 
(2002) has argued that, due to recent scientific develop­
ments, our uniqueness—the ontological discontinuity 
between human beings and other species—has to be 
redefined. He builds his argument on the observation that 
we find ourselves in the midst of a monumental period of 
advance in the life sciences and that this revolution chal­
lenges us to rethink the way we envision ourselves. Science 
and technology, rather than political ideologies, have 
become the powers that are now shaping human history. 
Due to Darwinism we already came to see ourselves as the 
temporary product of an evolutionary process that had been 
going on for millions of years and will continue well into 
the future (p. 6). The implication was that there appeared to 
be no fixed human characteristics. And this already posed a 
problem for a humanistic understanding of our ‘‘human­
ness’’. Characteristics that we tend to regard as 
‘‘essentially’’ human and as exemplifying human dignity 
are in reality the accidental by-products of our evolutionary 
history. Apparently, there seems to be no such thing as 
human nature. Rather, human nature seems to be funda­
mentally changeable. And if we insist on identifying one 
specific feature as ‘‘typically human’’, it will probably be 
our general capability to choose what we want to be, to 
modify ourselves in accordance with our desires. So, ‘‘why
don’t we simply accept our destiny as creatures who 
modify themselves?’’ (p. 6).
Fukuyama, however, is not willing to accept this 
apparently inevitable conclusion. Rather he argues that 
human nature does exist and that it provides a stable con­
tinuity to our experience of ourselves as a species (p. 7). 
According to Fukuyama, our essential characteristics, our 
‘‘human nature’’ has remained fairly stable throughout 
history (p. 13). Although cultural evolution and techno­
logical progress have led many modern thinkers to believe 
that human beings are almost infinitely plastic (p. 13), our 
essential humanness has remained unaffected since time 
immemorial.
Building on the writings of Kass (1993) and others, 
Fukuyama argues that technology has always played a 
somewhat ambivalent role in human history. On the one 
hand, technology is the basis of our freedom. At the same 
time, however, technology very often entails the threat of 
dehumanisation and enslavement. Many technological 
advances of the past actually reduced human freedom. The 
development of Neolithic agriculture, for example, led to 
the emergence of large hierarchical societies and made 
slavery more feasible than it had been in hunter-gatherer 
times (p. 15). This dual nature of technology notably 
applies to the genomics-based biotechnologies of the 
present. According to Fukuyama, the HGP has opened up 
new possibilities to manipulate human nature. Thus, 
genomics directly or indirectly poses a threat to human 
dignity. In the future, more precise knowledge of molecular 
and neural pathways may further our understanding of the 
genetic basis of behaviour. Indeed, ‘‘the sheer accumula­
tion of knowledge about genes and behaviour’’ (p. 31) may 
put changing human nature—genetic self-modification in 
the context of human enhancement—on the agenda.
In Fukuyama’s book, this discussion is developed more 
or less along the three lines we distinguished above. The 
HGP makes it possible to redefine ourselves in terms of our 
genome, both individually and collectively. This redefini­
tion may fuel the desire to ‘‘improve’’ ourselves. As soon 
as we have assessed our strengths and weaknesses, either 
collectively or individually, biotechnology may subse­
quently provide us with the tools to boost our strengths and 
diminish our deficiencies. We may want to enhance the 
human condition through genetic self-amelioration. In 
contrast to the eugenic movement of the past, moreover, 
such a ‘‘new’’ eugenics may well develop in a liberal, 
bottom-up fashion, and enhancement may be pursued by 
individuals themselves. We are already using drugs such as 
Prozac that are part of the ‘‘neurotransmitter revolution’’ in 
order to modify our basic mood or state of mind, for 
instance by increasing the level of serotonin in our brain 
(Svenaeus 2007, 2009). The next step will come when 
pharmaceutical companies will make it possible to tailor
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this type of drug administration to genetic profiles of 
individual consumers. And finally, instead of taking drugs, 
it may become possible to enhance our state of mind in 
more direct and lasting ways, namely by modifying the 
genetic networks that are involved in neurotransmitter 
biochemistry. Thus, in such a techno-cultural environment, 
Big Brother will no longer be necessary to put us on the 
route towards a genomics-based Brave New World.
Yet, notwithstanding the opportunities and benefits this 
may offer to individuals suffering from depression, defi­
cient impulse control, susceptibility to alcoholism and 
similar behavioural problems, a threat may emerge on the 
collective level, namely the threat that biotechnology ‘‘will 
cause us in some way to lose our humanity—that is, some 
essential quality that has always underpinned our sense of 
who we are and where we are going, despite all of the 
evident changes that have taken place in the human con­
dition through the course of history’’ (p. 101). Worse yet, 
we might make this change ‘‘without recognizing we had 
lost something of great value’’ (idem). We might thus 
emerge ‘‘on the other side of the great divide between 
human and posthuman history and not even see that the 
watershed had been breached because we lost sight of what 
that essence was’’ (ibidem).
At the same time, however, genomics comes to our 
rescue as it were, because it allows us, much more precisely 
than ever before, to define what it is that makes us human. It 
may help us to outline the typical genetic ‘‘essence’’ of the 
human species, by elucidating the genetic basis of a number 
of specific cognitive features (p. 140). According to 
Fukuyama, genomics will reveal the existence of some 
essential human quality that is worth to be respected—and 
he calls it ‘‘Factor X ’’ (p. 149), the human essence. This 
Factor X refers to the species-typical human characteristics 
that emerged *  100,000 years ago (p. 152), as the result of 
an ‘‘ontological leap’’ that occurred somewhere in the 
evolution process, an event that in the near future will be 
further elucidated by genomics research no doubt. 
According to Fukuyama, Factor X is a genetic endowment 
that distinguishes a human being in essence from other 
types of creatures (p. 171). It outlines the key qualities that 
contribute to human dignity and that we should want to 
protect from any future advances in biotechnology (p. 172). 
It constitutes the genetic constellation we should want to 
protect against attempts at self-modification (p. 172).
Finally, Fukuyama argues, genomics allows us to put 
this debate in a historical perspective. Human nature is the 
result of a long history that is reflected in our genomes. 
Somehow, we evolved into animals capable of self-modi­
fication. History has brought about huge changes in human 
perceptions and behaviours, to such an extent that a 
member of a hunter-gatherer society and an inhabitant of 
the contemporary information society may seem in many
respects to belong to different species. Evolving human 
institutions and cultural arrangements have produced dif­
ferent human moral attitudes over time. Although the 
coming into being of mankind remains an essentially 
‘‘mysterious process’’ (p. 176), evolutionary genomics may 
gradually elucidate this terra incognita. Yet, this new 
knowledge will also provide us with an unprecedented 
sense of power. The inevitable next step will be that we 
want to ‘‘breed something beyond man’’, that we may feel 
incited to by-pass the natural limits constraining the pro­
cess of self-modification to what has hitherto been possible 
(p. 128). But Fukuyama does not want us to move in that 
direction, as it would entail a denial of the concept of 
human dignity, i.e. the idea that there is something unique 
about the human race that deserves to be protected. 
Therefore, the challenge for the future resides in the 
political control of biotechnology. The Factor X, or human 
nature genomically redefined—that which gives us a moral 
sense and provides us with the social skills to live in 
society, that which has been a constant ever since there 
have been human beings (p. 102)— should be safeguarded 
by establishing a robust and global regulatory framework.
The post-humanistic response: Peter Sloterdijk 
on anthropotechnologies
A prominent protagonist of the ‘‘post-humanistic’’ response 
is Peter Sloterdijk. Initially, both Fukuyama and Sloterdijk 
appear to move in similar directions, as Fukuyama’s book 
opens with a quotation from Heidegger that also provides a 
starting point for Sloterdijk’s line of thought—and that 
therefore deserves to be quoted in full, namely: ‘‘The threat 
to man does not come in the first instance from the 
potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. 
The actual threat ... threatens man with the possibility that 
it could be denied to him to enter into a more original 
revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal 
truth’’. Yet, in Sloterdijk’s case, this passage opens up a 
completely different, namely ‘‘post-humanistic’’ way of 
addressing the issue.
According to Heidegger, to whose work Sloterdijk 
devoted an important volume of essays (2001),7 we cannot 
understand ourselves as long as we regard mankind as a 
biological species. We are not an ‘‘animal rationale’’, He­
idegger argues, and the humanness of human beings cannot 
be grasped in biological terms. What characterises human 
existence is our remarkable openness towards the world.
7 His famous, or infamous, lecture ‘‘Regeln für den Menschenpark: 
Ein Antwortschreiben zu Heideggers Brief über den Humanismus’’, 
by becoming embedded in this volume, is thereby placed in its proper 
theoretical context.
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We do not perceive the world merely in terms of food or 
opportunities for displaying species-characteristic behav­
iours. Rather, we tend to engage in an ethical, esthetical, 
epistemological and political manner8 with the world 
around us. We build a world. Or, as Heidegger phrases it: 
while animals are fully embedded in their natural environ­
ments, we stand out towards the world, we are dwelling in a 
‘‘clearing’’ (‘‘Lichtung’’). But where does this openness, 
this clearing come from, how has it emerged? According to 
Heidegger, it is a gift from Being, a ‘‘Geschick des Seins’’ 
as he time and again phrases it. For Sloterdijk, this answer is 
no longer sufficient. In recent years, both the life sciences 
and the human sciences have evolved in such a way that it 
should now be possible to analyse more explicitly the 
genesis or genealogy of this ‘‘openness’’, this ‘‘clearing’’ 
that characterises human existence.
Technology has played a crucial role in the process of 
‘‘anthropogenesis’’, the coming into being of mankind. Yet, 
while a ‘‘humanistic’’ anthropology will opt for a more or 
less instrumental view of technology, seeing human beings 
as producers and users of techniques and tools, Sloterdijk 
rather sees human beings as products of technological 
developments, as the outcome of a techno-cultural history. 
Since time immemorial, human beings and technology have 
been evolving interactively as it were. They are involved in 
a complicated process of co-evolution. This means that 
technology cannot be seen merely as an ‘‘instrument’’ for 
achieving certain goals. Rather, technology belongs to the 
core essence of what we are. Various techniques gave rise to 
practices such as reading, writing, calculating, and the 
establishment of legal and administrative networks that 
have shaped our emotions and cognitive functions. Our 
intelligence should not only be seen as a function of our 
neurological networks, but also as a function of the techno- 
cultural environments that we created and that actually 
facilitate— and to a certain extent even produce—intelli­
gent types of behaviour. For example, our ability to 
calculate was considerably boosted by the introduction of 
Arabic numerals. Similar to the way thinking in general is 
intimately connected with language use, so specific forms 
of communication and transmission of information have 
brought forward particular forms of thinking.
Moreover, through technology, mankind has, since time 
immemorial, produced protective environments, life-worlds 
or ‘‘spheres’’ (Sloterdijk 1998, 1999, 2004). The prehistoric 
cave, where ancestors engaged in group dynamics, gathered 
around a domestic (domesticated) fire, was a first spheric, 
protective environment, an artificial uterus where human 
beings began to modify themselves and where, gradually, 
social, communicative and artistic skills became
8 Politics may be here defined as: establishing laws based on 
principles and rights rather than power and status.
increasingly important in comparison to purely physical 
characteristics. Humans need these spheric, uterus-like 
extensions because we are born into this world prematurely, 
biologically speaking much too soon. These protective 
spheres, that have gradually evolved into increasingly 
complex constellations, allow us to dramatically extend the 
developmental stages of life. According to Sloterdijk, the 
ancient rural village was another ‘‘spheric’’ domestication 
scene, and the metropolises of the present can likewise be 
seen as techno-spheric constellation that protects us from 
the challenges of all-too-natural environments. Natural 
challenges are more or less replaced by technology-driven 
ones. These new challenges can be quite demanding, of 
course, but not in a purely physical sense. Rather they force 
us, but at the same time as enable us, to significantly 
enhance our cognitive and communicative talents.
In this context one specific concept is of crucial impor­
tance for Sloterdijk (2001) namely ‘‘antropotechnologies’’. 
These can be defined as technologies for hominisation, or 
civilisation of the human subject. According to Sloterdijk, 
human history can be described in terms of a series of an­
thropotechnologies that we developed in order to shape, 
transform and civilise mankind, both collectively and indi­
vidually. A very important anthropotechnology has been 
‘‘alphabetisation’’, the effort to teach individuals to read and 
write, to civilise them by exposing them to forms of trans­
generational communication that were made possible by 
epistolary techniques for writing and reproducing texts. 
Initially, only the cultural elite had access to these new 
symbolic environments, but gradually, the alphabetisation 
process spread, like a cultural epidemic, until eventually 
even the lower strata of society were affected. Until recently, 
we relied primarily on ‘‘soft’’ anthropotechnologies such as 
training and education. In the near future, Sloterdijk argues, 
new generations of ‘‘hard’’ anthropotechnologies are likely 
to become available. Notably genomics-based biotechnolo­
gies will increasingly allow us to improve ourselves in more 
direct ways than has been possible in the past. We have 
always been improving ourselves, modifying ourselves, 
working on ourselves. There is no reason to expect that we 
will suddenly stop doing so, either now or in the future. Still, 
given the frightening and unprecedented powers these new 
biotechnologies are expected to set loose, a completely new 
form of ethics will have to be developed in order to allow us 
to govern and domesticate them.
As in the case of Fukuyama, Sloterdijk develops his 
views along the three lines distinguished in the beginning 
of the article. First of all, there is the historical or genea­
logical line of thinking. The life sciences, notably 
genomics, are shedding new light on the process of ho­
minisation, the emergence of the clearing, this remarkable 
openness towards the world that is so essentially human. 
Our genomes contain the archives of this development and
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genomics research may be seen as complementing and 
deepening the knowledge coming from more traditional 
sources. Our genomes contain the footprints of this 
development, but in a rather specific way. We cannot 
meaningfully say that we are our genome, or that our 
genome is a kind of blueprint or mirror in which we can 
readily see and recognize ourselves. Rather, what we are is 
the outcome of an intricate co-evolution between our 
genomes and our technologies, between our genetic evo­
lution on the one hand and the evolution of our 
technospheric environments on the other. Until now, we 
have studied this co-evolution primarily by focussing on 
the tool and techniques in which it became materialised 
(pottery, tools made from bones, stones, or iron up to 
paintings, ornaments and other artistic remainders). Now, 
the insights coming from these traditional sources are 
complemented by genomics evidence. It is by studying the 
interaction between genomic evolution and technocultural 
evolution that a comprehensive picture of human beings, 
journeying through history, becomes visible.
Besides this genealogical dimension, the post-humanistic 
position represented by Sloterdijk is interested in the indi­
vidual and collective dimensions as well. Human beings are 
motivated by a will to improve themselves, a drive towards 
self-amelioration, either individually or collectively. Our life 
narratives and individual autobiographies are about learning 
from experience, about the acquisition of novel skills on 
order to face new challenges emerging in the context of 
rapidly transforming techno-cultural environments. This 
process will continue in the future. Why should we be sat­
isfied with the ways in which we have developed so far? 
According to Sloterdijk, our practices of the Self, our ‘‘self­
labour’’ as it were, is now entering a new phase. We will use 
our genomics insights to proceed with this process of self­
amelioration, along two lines. First of all by using genomics 
information for self-management. We will increasingly tai­
lor our life styles and training programmes to bioinformation 
concerning the strengths and weaknesses of our genome. But 
eventually, more and more opportunities will emerge that 
allow us to influence our genomes more directly. And the 
pace of techno-cultural development is such that in the future 
‘‘soft’’ anthropotechniques may no longer suffice to adapt 
ourselves to the challenges of future environments in a suf­
ficiently adequate way.
The basic flaw of humanism, as Sloterdijk sees it, is to 
define biotechnology as a threat coming from outside as it 
were. Rather, technology must be seen as part of our 
essence, as part of our way of being-in-the-world. We are 
not a purely natural entity that can be defined in terms of its 
genes. In the long-winded process of ‘‘hominisation’’ a 
great variety of technologies have played an active role. We 
are both the producers and the products of our ‘‘anthropo- 
genesis’’. We are more or less man-made, the outcome of a
long anthropogenic history. And there is no convincing 
reason why humanity as it has evolved so far should all of a 
sudden be ‘‘frozen’’, as it were, into its current state, why we 
should abandon our plasticity. In short, whereas the 
humanistic tradition sees it as our moral obligation to 
safeguard the integrity of the human subject vis-a-vis 
invasive technologies, Sloterdijk rather argues that we 
should be aware of the extent to which humanity and per- 
sonhood are actually the products of techno-scientific 
developments. This does not mean that anything goes. On 
the contrary, Sloterdijk refers to the new anthropotechnol­
ogies of the future as ‘‘das Ungeheure’’, the immensely 
frightening. Yet, as long as we cling to humanistic strategies 
of immunisation, we will not be able to adequately prepare 
ourselves for the future that is rapidly coming towards us.
As Sloterdijk (2001) points out, through genomics and 
brain research, techno-scientific developments are now 
entering the very ‘‘citadel’’ of human personhood. This not 
only affects our understanding of ourselves, but also our 
repertoire of possibilities for modifying our vicissitudes as 
human beings, notably in terms of counteracting neuro­
physical decline.9 The question will be who is to assess and 
determine the societal impact of these developments? Who 
is to determine what possible pathways are to be developed 
and what pathways are to be avoided? W ill these decisions 
be made on an individual, or rather on a collective level— 
in the context of ‘‘practices of the Self’’ or in the context of 
‘‘biopower’’, to use a Foucauldian formulation? Unlike 
‘‘transhumanists’’, who vigorously advocate upcoming 
possibilities of improving ourselves, the post-humanist 
Sloterdijk rather tends to steer a middle course by indi­
cating, on the one hand, that we will be open in principle to 
genomics-based modifications, sometime in the near or 
distant future, while on the other hand urging us not to 
exaggerate our expectations in this direction.10 We are 
neither to close our eyes to what is happening, nor are we 
to put ourselves at the mercy of overoptimistic visions of 
emerging prospects for human ‘‘enhancement’’.
An emerging anthropology in outline
In the course of history, human beings have dramatically 
transformed themselves, either directly (through training
9 ‘‘Im Fortgang der technologischen Evolution wird die Zitadelle der 
Subjektivität, das denkende und erlebende Ich, angetastet‘‘ (p. 220).
10 ‘‘Der Mens [ist] ein Produkt ... ein für weitere Ausarbeitung 
offenes’’ (p. 167).
11 ‘‘Dies hatte zur Voraussetzung, dass die Forschergemeinschaft wie 
die Gesellschaften Einsicht nahmen in die evolutionaren und kultur­
ellen Bedingungen des Ausnahme-Wesens, dessen genetische 
Information sie in einzelnen Fallen zu manipulieren vorhaben. 
Insbesondere kommt es darauf an, sich von überspannten Optimi­
erungsvorstellungen fern zu halten’’ (p. 203).
Ô  Springer
Genomics and identity 135
and civilisation) or indirectly (through developing the 
technocultural environments that have shaped us), and we 
will continue to do so in the future. Hegel once noted that 
our moral conscience is neither given nor fixed. Rather, it 
constitutes an evolving dimension of what we are. The 
Greek, as he phrased it, did not yet have a conscience as we 
know it,12 and even the ‘‘demonic’’ conscience of Socrates 
was quite unlike ours. A century later, Freud in his turn 
discovered that, besides our conscience and our con­
sciousness, even our ‘‘unconscious’’ has a history (Lacan 
1978). Yet, from a historical perspective, all these changes 
in personality structure, faithfully recorded in countless 
written documents, are fairly recent. As ‘‘excessive’’ 
information is now quickly accumulating concerning 
changes that took place *  10,000 or even *  100,000 years 
ago, our temporal horizon is broadening. The true scope of 
our journey towards humanness becomes visible. And in 
view of our remarkable plasticity, it would be artificial 
indeed to define human nature in an essentialist way. We 
are changing entities, constantly evolving, and to define 
human nature ‘‘biologistically’’, that is: in biological and 
even genetic terms, as Fukuyama urges us to do, does not 
seem to do justice to our openness to the world, our 
openness to change.
Both Fukuyama and Sloterdijk agree that we are currently 
finding ourselves on the threshold of a new era in which the 
technosciences will become the major propelling force, but 
from that point onwards their prognoses differ. Although 
they represent contrary positions, they actually do so in fairly 
moderate and nuanced ways. Fukuyama is moderate in the 
sense that he is explicitly aware of our openness to historical 
change, as we have seen. And Sloterdijk is moderate in the 
sense that he does not share the euphoric assessments of the 
promises of human enhancement articulated by so-called 
‘‘transhumanists’’ such as Nick Bostrom.13 Interestingly, 
however, in at least one respect Fukuyama’s views are more 
congenial with those of these fairly ‘‘radical’’ trans-human­
ists than with those of Sloterdijk. Both Fukuyama and 
Bostrom fall victim to the pitfalls of genetic determinism. 
‘‘Transhumanism’’, the conscious will to go beyond 
humanity as it has evolved so far, is depicted by Fukuyama as 
a major threat to human culture. And it is in the face of this 
threat that he proposes to determine the unique genetic 
human constitution (our ‘‘Factor X ’’) as something to be 
preserved, a genetic endowment that allows us to become 
human, distinguishing us ‘‘in essence from other types of 
creatures’’ (p. 171). Obviously, however, both Fukuyama 
and his trans-humanistic antagonists start from the idea that
12 ,,So sind sie -  so leben sie/Griechen hatten kein Gewissen/ ... 
Können keine Rechenschaft geben, kein Gewissen“ (Hegel 1970, zu § 
147).
13 http://www.nickbostrom.com/.
we apparently are our genes, and that we can modify our­
selves (for better or for worse) or maintain ourselves by 
adding, deleting or preserving genes. This idea of genetic 
‘‘determinism’’ is blatantly at odds with the complexities of 
causal trajectories from genes to traits that are actually being 
explored and revealed by genomics research (Zwart 2007a, 
b). Life is really far too complex for such scenarios to be 
credible. The historical vicissitudes of our conscience, our 
consciousness and the unconscious emerge against the 
backdrop of an ongoing dialogue between genomes and 
technologies. Thus, while humanism and transhumanism 
mirror one another, as they actually build in similar flaws, 
Sloterdijk’s view emerges as the more congenial starting 
point for future debate.
There will always be a tension between our ‘‘Palaeolithic’’ 
genome and our contemporary techno-cultural environ­
ments. Time and again, new generations of ‘‘barbarians’’ are 
born into this world whose DNA carries a genome sequence 
that has evolved under Palaeolithic conditions and who 
therefore have to become civilised one way or the other in 
order to flourish in the context of our life-worlds. Biological 
(Darwinian) evolution is much too slow to keep up with the 
accelerating pace of techno-cultural change. Therefore, the 
distance between our genome and our advancing techno- 
cultural environments is bound to increase. Society can 
basically be seen as a kind of ongoing ‘‘dialogue’’ between 
the two. And one could argue that behavioural genomics 
basically focuses on those genetic factors that, in view of 
their ‘‘Palaeolithic’’ origins, fail to meet the demands of 
modern societies. Yet, it would be naïve to think that this can 
be achieved by safeguarding, adding or deleting single 
genes. Rather, we will have to focus on the complex inter­
plays between networks of genetic and environmental 
factors explored by genomics research.
As genomics is taking us beyond the paradigm of genetic 
determinism, self-amelioration by adding or deleting genes 
becomes increasingly implausible. What is much more 
likely is that genomics information will increasingly influ­
ence our practices of identity-formation, will increasingly 
be built into our ‘‘presentations of Self in everyday life’’, as 
Goffmann (1959) phrased it, will be absorbed into our self­
images, in order to tailor our practices of Self to our per­
sonalised genome sequences. We will keep working on 
ourselves, no doubt, not by modifying our genomes, but 
rather by fine-tuning our ‘‘soft’’ anthropotechnologies on 
the basis of novel forms of bioinformation. To articulate this 
in phenomenological terms: what we are experiencing is a 
bioinformatisation of the life-world. Genomics-based 
technologies have begun to pervade our daily lives, our 
autobiographies and narratives, as well as our anthropolo­
gies, rather than our genomes as such.
Eventually, the implications of these developments must 
be addressed in bioethical terms: in terms of agency. This
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requires bioethical principles that operate on the level of 
the Self, addressing questions such as: Who can be regar­
ded as the author of these novel genomics-based identities 
that are envisioned? W ill these new technologies invite 
individuals to constitute themselves as subjects, or will new 
identities rather be produced by emerging discursive 
practices and strategies of classification and demarcation? 
Rather than trying to distinguish these options as distinct 
scenarios, we should acknowledge that they belong toge­
ther as complementary dimensions or axes of one and the 
same development. We are authors of new types of biog­
raphies, but also temporary outcomes or products of new 
discursive pathways. A comprehensive view should com­
bine an epistemology of the new knowledge forms that are 
emerging with analyses, both of the genomics-based gov­
ernance regimes they generate and of the practices of 
identity-formation they enable.
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